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Why	the	extensive	use	of	executive	orders	by	state
governors	may	not	be	a	threat	to	democracy
Like	the	president,	state	Governors	frequently	make	use	of	executive	orders	in	order	to
pursue	their	agendas.	But	do	these	unilateral	actions	undermine	democracy?	No,	argue
Alexandra	G.	Cockerham	and	Robert	E.	Crew,	Jr,	who	find	that	legislatures	can	be
willing	to	delegate	policy-making	authority	to	governors	if	they	are	of	the	same	party	or	if
the	legislature	is	fragmented.
In	the	month	following	his	January	16th	inauguration,	the	new	Governor	of	New	Jersey,	Phil	Murphy,	signed	11	major
executive	orders	on	issues	ranging	from	equal	pay	to	access	to	health	insurance	to	marijuana	policy.	While	in	studies
of	the	presidency	such	actions	are	usually	seen	as	a	way	to	circumvent	a	disagreeable	Congress,	many	scholars
who	study	US	state	governors	now	suggest	that	such	unilateral	action	may	not	be	driven	exclusively	by	efforts	to
circumvent	a	hostile	legislature.	Instead,	they	may	come	also	as	a	response	to	delegation	granted	by	the	legislature
as	a	means	of	expediting	action.	If	this	is	true,	then	concerns	that	unilateral	action	invariably	shifts	the	institutional
balance	of	power	in	favor	of	the	executive	and	threatens	democratic	government	may	be	overblown.
Existing	research	on	unilateral	action	focuses	on	one	governmental	setting,	the	presidency,	which	limits	our
understanding	of	how	chief	executives	with	different	degrees	of	formal	power	use	unilateral	action	and	about	how
legislatures	of	varying	capacity	respond.	In	new	research,	we	examine	the	use	of	executive	orders	in	a	cross-
sectional	context	(the	US	states),	thus	providing	a	more	comprehensive	perspective	of	where	unilateral	action	fits	in
relation	to	other	executive	powers	and	why	it	is	used.	The	executive	orders	we	examined	are	shown	in	Figure	1.
Figure	1	–	Distribution	of	Average	Number	of	Significant	Policy-Relevant	Executive	Orders	(Among	State-
Years,	2010-2014)
Note:	Alaska	had	an	average	of	0.75	executive	orders	per	year	and	Hawaii	had	an	average	of	2.	Also,	Nebraska	is	not	colored	on
the	map	because	it	is	omitted	from	our	analysis.
Bargaining	Between	the	Governor	and	the	State	Legislature
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The	legislative	process	cements	a	policy	into	law.	If	a	governor	were	guaranteed	complete	bargaining	success	and
the	legislature	were	assured	that	legislation	would	conform	exactly	to	the	majority	party’s	policy	preferences,	both
branches	would	prefer	to	formulate	policy	via	the	legislative/bargaining	process.	Typically,	however,	bargaining	with
the	legislature	requires	some	compromise	from	the	governor.	Thus,	governors	can	accept	policies	they	view	as	less
than	ideal	but	that	are	more	likely	to	endure,	or	they	can	implement	their	ideal	policies,	knowing	that	they	could	be
overturned	when	they	leave	office.	As	a	governor’s	expected	success	from	negotiating	with	the	legislature	declines,
he	or	she	has	less	incentive	to	bargain	and	greater	incentive	to	circumvent	the	legislature	by	issuing	executive
orders.
Previous	research	on	the	use	of	executive	orders,	conducted	almost	exclusively	on	the	relationship	between	the
President	and	the	US	Congress,	shows	that	the	variation	in	the	use	of	these	orders	is	driven	to	a	large	extent	by	the
political	relationship	between	the	two	institutions.	We	suggest	that	the	use	of	executive	orders	may	also	be	related	to
the	institutional	strength	of	either	of	these	two	bodies.
Powers	of	the	Legislature	
Professional	legislators	work	full-time	at	the	job	and	have	more	staff	members	than	part-time	or	citizen	legislators.
Thus,	they	have	a	greater	capacity	to	gather	information	and	formulate	policy,	giving	them	a	bargaining	advantage.
In	addition,	comparative	studies	have	shown	that	when	the	legislature	and	executive	are	of	the	same	party	but	the
legislature	is	unable	to	get	its	desired	policy	passed	due	to	lack	of	capability	(time,	staff,	etc.),	legislators	may	accede
to	the	use	of	executive	orders.	Under	these	conditions,	the	legislature	may	delegate	authority	to	the	governor,	sitting
by	supportively	while	the	governor	uses	an	executive	order	to	move	policy	in	the	direction	of	the	unified	party.	
Powers	of	the	Executive	
Since	a	higher	level	of	formal	power	gives	the	executive	more	influence	when	interacting	with	both	the	legislature
and	the	bureaucracy,	a	stronger	governor	would	likely	prefer	to	bargain	with	the	legislature	so	that	the	resulting
policy	will	be	more	durable	and	to	avoid	rancor	that	might	affect	future	interactions.
“New	Jersey	Governor	Phil	Murphy	signs	his	first	Executive	Order	promoting	equal	pay	for	women	on	Tuesday,	January	16th,
2018.	Edwin	J.	Torres/	GovernorÕs	Office.”	by	Phil	Murphy	is	licensed	under	CC	BY	NC	2.0
What	we	found
We	used	regression	models	to	test	hypotheses	around	the	relationship	between	the	number	of	executive	orders
issued	by	a	governor	and	their	level	of	formal	power,	whether	the	government	is	divided	and	how	professional	or
fragmented	the	legislature	is.
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We	find	that	a	governor	will	act	unilaterally	when	bargaining	with	the	legislature	is	costly	–	that	is,	if	a	governor	is
relatively	weak	or	when	legislative	capacity	is	strong,	he	or	she	will	issue	more	executive	orders.	In	addition,	our
results	show	that	the	legislature	will	relinquish	policy-making	authority	to	the	governor	when	it	is	of	the	same	party	as
the	governor	and	when	it	has	less	operational	capacity	(e.g.	is	less	professional	or	more	fragmented).
Why	we	shouldn’t	be	nervous	about	governors’	use	of	executive	orders
Our	analysis	illustrates	the	importance	of	considering	the	use	of	executive	orders	across	the	US	states.	American-
based	theories	of	unilateral	action	predict	that	executives	will	use	these	instruments	to	usurp	legislative	power	and
that	their	extensive	or	easy	use	could	lead	to	a	break	down	in	the	balance	of	power	between	the	executive	and	the
legislature.
Our	results	show	that	governors	use	executive	orders	both	in	response	to	legislative	delegation	and	as	a	way	to
circumvent	legislative	authority.	We	have	also	shown	that	legislatures	are	willing	to	delegate	policy-making	authority
to	the	executive	rather	than	be	stymied	by	fragmentation	or	low	professionalism.
The	results	from	our	analysis	lead	us	to	suggest	that	concerns	about	excessive	use	of	unilateral	action	may	be
unnecessary.	First,	stronger	chief	executives	appear	to	use	their	formal	powers	to	bargain	with	legislatures	rather
than	to	threaten	them	with	unilateral	action.	In	addition,	there	are	instances	in	which	legislatures	may	favor	the	use	of
unilateral	action.
This	article	is	based	on	the	paper,	‘Factors	Affecting	Governors’	Decisions	to	Issue	Executive	Orders’,	in	State
and	Local	Government	Review.	
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